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CONSIDERING “CITIZENSHIP TAXATION”:
IN DEFENSE OF FATCA
by
Young Ran (Christine) Kim* 1
ABSTRACT
Inspired by Ruth Mason’s recent article, Citizenship Taxation, which
reaches a general conclusion against citizenship taxation, this Article also questions
citizen taxation under the same normative framework, but with a particular focus on
efficiency and administrability, and takes a much less critical stance towards the
merits of citizenship taxation. First, neither citizenship taxation nor residence-based
taxation can completely account for the differences between residents’ and
nonresidents’ ability to pay taxes under the fairness argument. Second, the efficiency
argument, that citizenship taxation may distort both Americans’ and non-Americans’
citizenship decisions, is not convincing. The American citizenship renunciation rate
is not particularly serious compared to other countries, and it is U.S. immigration
law, not U.S. tax law, that should be blamed for obstructing highly skilled and
educated immigrants. Third, despite enforcement difficulties abroad under the
administrative argument, determining residence by considering all facts and
circumstances in residence-based taxation would be worse than the bright-line
citizenship criterion in citizenship taxation.
After discussing the competing normative arguments on citizenship taxation,
this Article aims to defend the administrability of citizenship taxation in conjunction
with new reporting obligations. Individual taxpayers’ obligations to file Foreign
Bank Account Reports (FBAR) or report under the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA) are not seriously onerous. The fact that citizenship
taxation along with FBAR and FATCA enhances global transparency further
supports the case for citizenship taxation.

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law
(starting Jul. 2017); J.S.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 2012; LL.B., Seoul National University School of Law, 2002. I would like to
thank Mitchell Kane, Ruth Mason, Susan Morse, Daniel Shaviro, and the participants in the
Taxation and Citizenship Conference at the University of Michigan for their helpful
comments on previous drafts of this Article. Yong Whan Choi, Esq. (International Tax LLM
‘15, NYU Law), Yu-Jie Chen (J.S.D. ‘16, NYU Law), Shu Chin Ng (International Tax LL.M.
‘16, NYU Law), Sam Seunghyun Yang (J.D. Candidate, NYU Law), Jennifer Graber (J.D.
Candidate, NYU Law), Ji-Hyun Ryu, Esq., and Min Young Sung, Esq. (LLM Candidate, UC
Berkeley Law) provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Is citizenship taxation by the United States a bad policy? The ongoing
debate over this question reveals that many scholars believe that it is. In her recent
article, Citizenship Taxation, 1 Ruth Mason reached a general conclusion against the
merits of citizenship taxation from a U.S. perspective based on the normative
framework of fairness, efficiency, and administrability. This Article evaluates
citizenship taxation under the same normative framework, but with a particular focus
on efficiency and administrability, which leads to a much less critical stance towards
the merits of citizenship taxation.
Part I briefly discusses the fairness argument on citizenship taxation,
focusing on the social obligation theory and the ability-to-pay principle. 2 This
Article emphasizes that neither citizenship taxation nor residence-based taxation can
completely account for the differences between residents’ and nonresidents’ ability
to pay taxes. Since the fairness analysis does not provide adequate grounds to
determine whether citizenship taxation is a good or bad policy, more extensive
analysis on the efficiency and administrability of citizenship taxation are required to
evaluate citizenship taxation.
Part II discusses the efficiency argument, examining whether citizenship
taxation would distort nonresident Americans’ citizenship decisions by encouraging
them to renounce their U.S. citizenship. 3 By providing the first comprehensive
empirical research on comparing renunciation rates in various countries, this Article
argues that nonresident Americans’ citizenship renunciation rate is not particularly
serious when compared to that of other countries. Another efficiency argument
against citizenship taxation is that it also distorts non-Americans’ immigration
decisions by discouraging them from becoming green-card holders or naturalizing. 4
However, what makes it difficult for wealthy and highly skilled foreigners to
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 175, 223–27.
Id. at 227–30.
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immigrate to the United States is not citizenship taxation or U.S. tax law in general,
but U.S. immigration law.
Part III discusses the administrability argument. Citizenship taxation has
been criticized as difficult to enforce on nonresident citizens abroad. However,
countries with residence-based taxation also face difficulties in enforcing their tax
laws abroad with respect to dual-residency or offshore assets and accounts.
Moreover, residence-based taxation confronts an additional hurdle on top of
enforcement difficulties: determining the residence of the individuals. Determining
residence by considering all facts and circumstances creates problems beyond
enforcement difficulties. The facts-and-circumstances test itself contains inherent
problems when compared to a bright-line test. But even if the countries with
resident-based taxation “win” in the tax dispute on residency, enforcement
difficulties on those individuals’ offshore assets would still remain. In this regard,
the bright-line citizenship criterion is definitely a virtue. Three South Korean cases
illustrate how serious the problem of determining residence can be under residencebased taxation.
In response to the discussion inspired by Mason on the competing normative
arguments of citizenship taxation, this Article further aims to defend the
administrability of citizenship taxation in conjunction with the Foreign Bank
Account Reports (FBARs) and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).
The debate on citizenship taxation was recently reignited when its critics condemned
the new obligations to file FBARs and FATCA as an excessive compliance burden
for nonresident citizens created by the Bank Secrecy Act. 5 Thus, although Mason’s
argument on the administrability prong is not primarily about FBAR and FATCA,
more general criticisms of citizenship taxation necessarily also imply criticism of
FBAR and FATCA, which were presumably enacted to administer citizenship
taxation more effectively. However, this Article argues that the current compliance
burden imposed on nonresident citizens by FBARs and FATCA is not onerous
because the rules have been improved through various exceptions and substantially
high reporting threshold amounts.
In addition to the merits of citizenship taxation generally, Part IV discusses
the merits of FATCA specifically. The opponents of FATCA claim that FATCA is
a bold manifestation of the “fiscal imperialism” of the United States, forcing foreign
financial institutions to serve as agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to raise
U.S. revenue. 6 The criticism has continued even after the U.S. government
committed to enter into Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) in an attempt to
address those concerns. 7 Nonetheless, FATCA has significant merits, not only as a
5.
See, e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad:
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 122 (2014); Reuven S. AviYonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT'L 389, 394 (May 3, 2010).
6.
Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, United States National Report on Exchange
of Information 4–5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 14-22, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2481080 (citing, among others, Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA
and US Fiscal Imperialism Threaten to Sink Global Economy, THE DAILY CALLER (Mar.
19, 2013, 1:30 A.M.), http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-and-us-fiscal-imperialismthreaten-to-sink-global-economy/).
7.
See, e.g., Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why
It Matters), 69 TAX NOTES INT'L 565 (Feb. 11, 2013); Peter Menyasz, Canadian IGA with
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means to enforce citizenship taxation, but also as a means to fight offshore tax
evasion. FATCA together with the OECD’s Automatic Exchange of Information
(AEOI) paved the way for drastically improving global cooperation on sharing tax
information. Thus, in considering whether the merits of FATCA outweigh the
demerits, tax scholars should consider not only the U.S. taxpayers’ compliance
burden imposed by FATCA, but also its positive impact on global efforts to combat
offshore tax evasion. This Article then contests the concern that FATCA exposes
taxpayers’ private information to potential abusive use by foreign tax authorities. In
conclusion, if FATCA makes the world better off by enhancing global transparency
on tax information, then this may serve as another support for citizenship taxation,
as well as an example of constructive exceptionalism.
I. FAIRNESS: FOCUSING ON THE ABILITY-TO-PAY PRINCIPLE
There are three representative theories under the fairness prong that justify
citizenship taxation: consent theory, benefit theory, and social obligation theory. 8
This Part briefly examines the first two theories, and then discusses the social
obligation theory, with a focus on the ability-to-pay principle.
First, consent theory argues that taxing nonresident citizens is justified
because retaining citizenship represents consent to such taxation. However, this
theory is criticized based on the argument that paying citizenship taxation does not
represent meaningful consent.9 Assuming that mere retention of citizenship by
nonresident Americans represents their consent to pay citizenship taxation is a
logical leap as not only taxation but also many other privileges and obligations are
at stake in maintaining a particular citizenship.
Second, benefit theory attempts to justify citizenship taxation as an
obligation of nonresident citizens in return for the benefits they receive from the
government. Given that not only the U.S. Supreme Court 10 but also the courts of
foreign countries, such as that of South Korea, 11 endorse the benefit theory, the
benefit theory seems to be at least intuitively appealing. However, critics disagree
and demonstrate that there are other policy reasons to grant such benefits to
nonresident citizens. 12 I also criticize the benefit theory because the relationship
between government benefits and taxation is more than a mere matter of quid pro
quo. Indeed, modern income taxes calculate the amount of tax by the taxpayers’
ability to pay, not by the benefits they receive.13 Edward Zelinsky, who supports
citizenship taxation because of its bright-line test, conceded that the benefit theory
U.S. on FATCA Faces Constitutional Challenge in Court, INT'L TAX MONITOR (BNA) (Nov.
14, 2014).
8.
Mason, supra note 1, at 187–211.
9.
Id. at 187–89.
10. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924).
11. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2012Guhap9437, Aug. 14,
2013, aff’d, Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2013Nu27359, Jan. 9, 2015, vacated,
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Du1243, Feb. 18, 2016, remanded to Seoul High Ct.,
2016Nu324, Feb. 7, 2017, appeal docketed, S. Ct., 2017Du244, Mar. 16, 2017 (S. Kor.)
[hereinafter Shipping Magnate Admin. Case].
12. Mason, supra note 1, at 189–96.
13. Id. at 196.
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does not justify citizenship taxation because “minimal benefits do not justify
maximal taxation.” 14
Benefit theory could further be criticized because it does not provide a
transcendent theoretical justification for citizenship taxation, but instead it
conveniently justifies certain tax positions, whether for citizenship taxation or for
residence-based taxation, taken by tax authorities or the courts ex post. For example,
if the court decides to tax a person as a citizen or a resident on either citizenship
taxation or residence-based taxation, it could explain such taxation by claiming that
such citizen or resident has been benefitting from society. If the court decides not to
tax her, it could reason that the benefit was too minimal to justify taxation. The fact
that the court of South Korea, which adopts residence-based taxation, endorses the
benefit theory strongly suggests that the benefit theory is not inherently related to
citizenship taxation. 15
Third, social obligation theory provides that, as a member of American
society, nonresident citizens also have an obligation to contribute taxes according to
their ability to pay. The underlying assumption of this theory is that people have an
obligation to pay taxes to support the members of the society to which they belong
in accordance with their ability to pay taxes, which should be measured by their
worldwide income. 16
Critics argue that the social obligation theory best defends citizenship tax
among the three traditional theories used to assess fairness. 17 However, opponents
of citizenship taxation criticize this theory because, although citizenship would
generally be a good proxy for national community membership, it would not be a
good proxy when citizens reside abroad. Furthermore, even if we assume that
nonresident citizens are included in that community, the current regime would
violate the ability-to-pay principle. 18 Due to the different factors affecting the ability
to pay, such as difference in the standard of living or amenities between places, “it
would be fairer to calculate a person’s ability to pay by reference to the place where
she lives rather than to the place where she holds her citizenship.” 19 If we are to tax
residents and nonresidents alike despite the differences across countries, we should
“actually tax them alike,” which would require the repeal of the foreign-earned
income exclusion and the allowance of unlimited foreign tax credits, including
foreign consumption taxes, as well as the implicit taxes and subsidies to compensate
the differences.20 Therefore, opponents of citizenship taxation would imply that
citizenship is a worse criterion than residence to measure the ability to pay. 21
Even residence-based taxation does not, however, completely account for
the differences between resident and nonresident taxpayers that affect their ability
to pay. To illustrate, consider the case of Korea, which uses residence-based taxation
for individuals, and its three citizens, A, B, and C. A resides in Korea and has never
14. Id. at 195 n.168; Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation:
Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1309 (2011).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 74–75.
16. Mason, supra note 1, at 196–97.
17. Id. at 197.
18. Id. at 197–210.
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 209–10.
21. Id. at 211.
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left there. B is a student studying in the United States only for the past three years.
C is a U.S. green-card holder, residing in the U.S only for the past three years. A has
only Korean-source income, while B and C have both Korean-source and U.S.source income. A and B are residents for Korean tax purposes, while C is a
nonresident for Korean tax purposes. Remember that even under residence-based
taxation, once an individual is determined to be a resident her worldwide income is
subject to taxation. Therefore, A’s and B’s worldwide income is subject to Korean
tax, whereas C’s Korean-source income is subject to Korean tax.
Table 1
Residence status
Citizen & resident
(never left Korea)

Income
Korean source

B

Citizen & resident
(studying in the U.S.
for past 3 yrs.)

Korean source
+ U.S. source

C

Citizen & nonresident
(obtained U.S. greencard 3 yrs. ago)

Korean source
+ U.S. source

A

Citizenship tax
Worldwide
income (Korean
source)
Worldwide
income
(Korean source
+ U.S. source)
Worldwide
income
(Korean source
+ U.S. source)

Residence-based tax
Worldwide income
(Korean source)
Worldwide income
(Korean source + U.S.
source)
Korean source income
only

As shown in Table 1, although A and C reside in different countries,
citizenship taxation taxes A and C alike by subjecting their worldwide income to
Korean tax. Residence-based taxation obviously taxes A and C differently—for C,
only Korean source income is subject to Korean tax. However, residence-based
taxation taxes A and B alike under the same principle applicable to residents,
although the factors affecting B’s ability to pay are different from those affecting A
for the past three years. In fact, B and C have been affected by the same factors for
the past three years.
In other words, under the ability-to-pay principle B and C ought to be taxed
alike, while A should be taxed differently, but neither citizenship taxation nor
residence-based taxation achieves this result. In the above example, residence-based
taxation may account for the difference between A and C, but it fails to account for
the similarity between B and C. On the other hand, citizenship taxation may account
for the similarity between B and C, but it fails to account for the difference between
A and C.
Therefore, even residence-based taxation does not completely account for
the differences between resident and nonresident taxpayers that affect their ability
to pay. Given that both citizenship-based and residence-based taxation have flaws
in accounting for ability to pay, it is unfair to blame the former and praise the latter
under the same ability-to-pay principle. 22 More importantly, the analysis under the

22. If the differences in the living standard, amenities, or social goods and services
are quantifiable, it is particularly unfair to draw such conclusion without undertaking
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fairness prong does not support either citizenship taxation or residence-based
taxation entirely. As a result, although Mason discusses the fairness concern more
thoroughly than the other two concerns throughout her paper, the fairness analysis
does not provide critical grounds to forgo citizenship taxation. Thus, whether
citizenship taxation is a good or bad policy depends more on the analysis under the
efficiency and the administrability prongs. The next two Parts explore the other two
prongs more deeply.
II. EFFICIENCY
A. Whether Citizenship Taxation Distorts Americans’ Choices
Commenters against citizenship taxation criticize its efficiency, arguing that
citizenship taxation distorts Americans’ citizenship decisions, particularly focusing
on nonresident Americans. For example, Mason asserts that “citizenship taxation
encourages nonresident Americans to renounce their U.S. citizenship purely for tax
reasons.” 23 However, she also concedes that “citizenship is inelastic” and
“citizenship taxation has not precipitated mass renunciations of citizenship.” 24
Then, a key question about the distortion of nonresident Americans’
citizenship decisions is how serious the renunciation problem is among nonresident
Americans and to what extent citizenship taxation distorts their citizenship decision.
In this regard, the renunciation rate of the diaspora population would be insightful
indicia regarding the nonresidents’ distortion problem. 25 Empirical data on the
volume of renunciation and diaspora population of the United States and comparable
countries are necessary for this purpose.
This quantitative comparison may not be a perfect tool to explain how
serious each country considers a marginal increase or decrease of renunciation.
There would be a number of factors to be considered to explain the renunciation
problem even qualitatively, such as whether the country allows dual citizenship, how
strong are national sentiments attached to citizenship, whether and to what extent
renunciation is treated as immoral and/or illegal, and so on. However, such
qualitative analysis embracing all such factors is beyond the scope of this Article.
The quantitative analysis of this Article represents a good start to understanding the
renunciation problem more empirically.
1. Loss of Nationality
First, I selected countries (as shown in Table 2 below) as comparable among
major trading partners of the United States in various regions. I tried to include as
many as possible of the OECD member states. However, I excluded several
empirical studies or drawing on existing data to compare the extent to which citizenship and
residence criteria account for the differences.
23. Mason, supra note 1, at 226.
24. Id. at 227.
25. A blog posting containing research by a nongovernmental organization
(NGO) inspired me to embark on the extended empirical analysis. See Eric, Comparing
Renunciation Rates Around the World, ISAAC BROCK SOC'Y (May 23, 2012),
http://isaacbrocksociety.ca/2012/05/23/comparing-renunciation-rates-around-the-world/.
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countries because they were not categorized as “high-income countries” by the
World Bank (WB) 26 or because there was no reliable official data on the loss of
nationality. 27 I added Hong Kong to the list because, although it is not a member of
the OECD, it is categorized as among “high-income countries” by the WB, 28 and
official data on the loss of nationality is available.
Before analyzing the statistics, I must note a couple of points. All countries
except the United States have a residence-based taxation system. Singapore, Taiwan,
and South Korea impose conscription on all male citizens. 29 The statistics of Japan, 30
26. THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2011 (2d ed.
2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2522. After I selected my
sample using the 2011 version, the 2016 version was released in late Dec. 2015, in which
twelve new countries are re-categorized as “high-income countries.” I decided to continue to
use the 2011 version for my study in order not to disrupt already completed work.
I compared the United States with developed and high-income countries in order to
control for many variables. Obviously, citizens in under-developed countries, economically
or politically, would have different motivations for renouncing citizenship and different
opportunities to migrate freely to foreign countries. I excluded Chile, Mexico, and Turkey
based on this criterion.
27. I excluded Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and Australia because official
statistics on the loss of nationality is not available.
Among European countries, I excluded France and Luxembourg because official
statistics on the loss of nationality is only available for one year—2008 for France and 2011
for Luxembourg. I also excluded Germany, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal,
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Spain because official statistics on the loss of nationality
are not available. See Maarten Peter Vink & Ngo Chun Luk, Mapping Statistics on Loss of
Nationality in the EU: A New Online Database (CEPS Paper in Liberty & Security in Europe
No. 76, 2014), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/mapping-statistics-loss-nationality-eunew-online-database.
For the statistical data on the loss of nationality of European countries (from
Belgium to the U.K.) between 2008 and 2012, I mostly use the statistical data from the
European Office of Statistics (Eurostat), available at Loss of Citizenship by Sex and New
Citizenship, EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_lct
&lang=en (last visited Feb. 15, 2017), rather than using the national statistics of each country.
However, for Hungary and Finland, I use the statistical data as reported by national sources
in EU member states. Vink & Luk, supra, at 18.
Some of the Eurostat data is reprinted in a report by the Center for European Policy
Studies. See id. at 17. Data for the year 2013 is available at the Eurostat website as well as at
European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, Statistics on Loss of Citizenship Data, EUDO CITIZENSHIP, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/statistics-on-loss-data/?stype=2&stat=0
(last visited Feb. 15, 2017). When the two data are in conflict, I use the Eurostat data.
28. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 26.
29. The World Factbook: Military Service Age and Obligation, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2024.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
30. There are two categories of Japanese loss of nationality—the first is kokuseki
ridatsu (国籍離脱), where a dual citizen, whether by birth or by naturalization, surrenders
her Japanese citizenship to resolve dual-citizenship status, and the second is kokuseki
soshitsu ( 国籍喪失 ), where a Japanese citizen acquires a foreign citizenship but did not
resolve the dual-citizenship status so that she (involuntarily) loses her Japanese citizenship.
See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ( 法 務 省 ), NATIONALITY Q&A ( 国 籍 Q&A) Q12,
http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji78.html#a12 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (Japan).
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South Korea, 31 and Hong Kong 32 include more than one category of expatriates.
Table 2: Loss of nationality per year (2008–2015)
2008
2009
Belgium
73
59
Croatia
1,694
1,352
Denmark
359
404
Estonia
29
115
Finland
67
52
Greece
7
45
Hong Kong
159
170
Hungary
87
78
Ireland
N/A
32
Japan
798
837
Netherlands
293
291
Poland
428
281
Singapore
1,200
1,200
Slovakia
182
182
Slovenia
31
32
S. Korea
20,439 22,011
Sweden
N/A
3
Taiwan
780
844
U.K.
585
567
U.S.
221
742
Sources in footnote. 33

2010
43
1,231
417
123
38
27
186
97
24
763
361
354
1,200
260
13
22,865
5
838
596
1,534

2011
54
1,442
291
101
79
20
204
154
30
880
355
310
1,200
351
35
22,797
2
740
491
1,781

2012
55
1,051
308
119
110
N/A
214
115
32
973
440
315
1,200
334
37
18,464
6
722
604
932

2013
41
537
346
145
92
N/A
241
186
38
1,147
479
95
1,200
N/A
N/A
20,090
6
680
598
3,000

2014
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
249
N/A
N/A
1,502
N/A
N/A
1,200
N/A
N/A
19,472
N/A
652
N/A
3,415

2015
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
243
N/A
N/A
1,439
N/A
N/A
1,200
N/A
N/A
17,529
N/A
759
N/A
4,279

31. Korean law is similar to that of Japanese law. The statistics on the loss of
nationality include two categories: kwukchuk itahl (국적이탈) and kwukchuk sangsil (국적상실),
which correspond to the two Japanese categories, respectively. See Statistics
on Nationality (국적통계추이), STATISTICS KOREA, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/Each
DtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1760 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (S. Kor.).
32. There are also two categories of loss of citizenship in Hong Kong: (i)
declaration of change of nationality; and (ii) renunciation of nationality, which also
corresponds to the two Japanese and Korean categories, respectively. See, e.g., Annual
Report 2012, IMMIGR. DEP'T, http://www.immd.gov.hk/publications/a_report_2012/en/ch3/
index.htm#c_3_9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
33. Hong Kong: Annual Report 2011, IMMIGR. DEP'T, http://www.immd.gov.hk
/publications/a_report_2011/en/ch3/index.html#b9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); Annual
Report 2012, supra note 32; Annual Report 2013, IMMIGR. DEP'T., http://www.immd.gov.
hk/publications/a_report_2013/en/ch3/index.html#c9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). For data of
2014 and 2015, see Chinese Nationality, IMMIGR. DEP'T, http://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/
facts/naturalisation-nationality.html (last updated Feb. 15, 2016). For data for earlier years,
see Eric, supra note 25.
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Chart 1, on the next page, depicts data for the key countries in Table 2; it
includes countries either whose data is available throughout the relevant research
years (2008–2015) or whose absolute number of renunciations exceeds 500 in any
given year.

Japan: MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ( 法 務 省 ), TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF APPLINATURALIZATION PERMIT ( 帰 化 許 可 申 請 者 数 等 の 推 移 ),
http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/toukei_t_minj03.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (Japan). The
number includes two cases—first, a Japanese person who is a dual citizen and voluntarily
relinquishes his or her Japanese citizenship, and second, a person who is stripped of
citizenship by the government due to the citizen’s inaction in resolving his or her dualcitizenship status.
Singapore: As for Singapore, there are no official statistics available for each year,
but the official transcript of the parliamentary proceedings provides that “[a]n average of
1,200 Singaporeans renounced their citizenship each year from 2007 to 2011.” Granting
Citizenship and Permanent Residency Status, PARLIAMENT OF SINGAPORE (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?currentTopicID=00076969-WA&currentPubID
=00076980-WA&topicKey=00076980-WA.00076969-WA_7%2Bid-5eaef9f3-0369-4ad98f98-6ac24eb907b6%2B#. I rely on this information and assume the same numbers for the
years 2012 through 2015.
South Korea: KOREA IMMIGRATION SERVICE, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, KIS
STATISTICS 2014, at 62 (2015); Statistics of Nationality, STATISTICS KOREA (2016),
http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1760 (last visited Feb.
17, 2017) (S. Kor.).
Taiwan: Statistical Yearbook of Interior (內政統計年報), 2.07 Loss of the R.O.C.
Nationality, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR: DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/
stat/year/elist.htm (last updated Mar. 2016) (Taiwan).
United States: I extracted the relevant data for the United States from quarterly
reports published by the Treasury and IRS. Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have
Chosen to Expatriate, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/quarterlypublication-of-individuals-who-have-chosen-to-expatriate (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
Other countries: For information regarding source of data for the other countries
listed, see supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
CANTS FOR
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Chart 1: Loss of nationality per year
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Although the absolute numbers of renunciations in other countries are quite
stable, the number of renunciations in the United States has been fluctuating.
Michael Kirsch’s observation of the U.S. statistics on citizenship renunciation from
1991 through 2013 provides more insight into understanding this recent fluctuation.
Kirsch explains that approximately 600 people per year lost their U.S. citizenship
from 1991 through 2001, 34 and then the number increased to approximately 800 per
year until 2005. 35 However, the number decreased to approximately 200 per year in
2006 through 2008, and then dramatically increased in 2009 through 2011, resulting
34.
35.

Kirsch, supra note 5, at 182 n.294.
Id. at 182.
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in 742 losses in 2009, 1,534 in 2010, and 1,781 in 2011. 36 Kirsch explains that the
increase in this period could be related to the UBS scandal 37 and the subsequent
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI) by the IRS to enforce citizenship
taxation and FBAR more effectively. 38 The number briefly decreased to 932 in 2012,
and then dramatically increased to 3,000 in 2013, which may be related to the
imminent implementation of FATCA. 39 After Kirsch’s research period, citizenship
renunciation slightly increased to 3,415 in 2014, and further increased to 4,279 in
2015 and to 5,409 in 2016. 40
Although U.S. citizenship renunciation has gradually increased since 2008,
the United States was not an outlier until 2013. The absolute number was similar to
that of other countries until 2013. However, the spike in 2013 ranked the United
States second highest, although the gap between the first (South Korea) and the
second highest is still significant, as shown in Table 2 and Chart 1. Again, however,
in order to understand how serious the recent renunciation problem is among
nonresident Americans, it is necessary to look into the ratio of expatriates relative to
diaspora population.
2. Diaspora Population
It is hard to obtain comprehensive and consistent data on the population of
nonresident citizens of various countries. Among various data on the similar
concepts as nonresident citizens, I found that data on the diaspora population is
likely the most available data for this analysis.
It is also hard to obtain and choose year-by-year statistics on the diaspora
population of various countries. Relying on national statistics is not a proper method.
First, not every country provides such statistics. Second, even though several
countries do so, the methodology, such as the definition of diaspora population,
varies across countries, rendering country-to-country comparison of the numbers
essentially meaningless. Thus, I use the consolidated data published by the United
Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) as of 2010 and 2013, 41 except Taiwan, 42 to
36. Id. at 182–83.
37. See infra text accompanying note 92.
38. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 185.
39. Id. at 183–84. The final regulations for FATCA, released in January 2013, set
the effective date of the 30% of FATCA withholding tax on certain payments as of January
1, 2014. However, it was subsequently delayed until July 1, 2014. Summary of FATCA
Timelines, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-FATCATimelines (last updated Jun. 2, 2016).
40. See supra note 33 (information regarding United States).
41. For UN data as of July 2010, see UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIVISION, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
MIGRANT STOCK: THE 2013 REVISION-MIGRANTS BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN tbl.7 (2013).
For UN data as of July 2013, see id. at tbl.10.
For WB data as of October 2010, see THE WORLD BANK, supra note 26. For WB
data as of 2013, see Bilateral Migration Matrix 2013, WORLD BANK (2013),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migrationremittances-data.
42. For Taiwan, I use the WB’s data in 2000, available at Global Bilateral
Migration| World DataBank, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.as
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create Table 3. I observed the trajectory of the diaspora population for additional
years and found that the number of diaspora population is quite stable. 43
Table 3: Diaspora population in 2010 and 2013
Belgium
Croatia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
Ireland
Japan
Netherlands
Poland
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Korea
Sweden
Taiwan
U.K.
U.S.

UN 2010
476,497
728,005
239,886
175,010
300,656
844,241
754,629
491,198
737,036
828,991
947,080
3,357,408
290,534
314,576
150,692
2,474,689
308,688
475,693
4,826,530
2,734,962

WB 2010
455,000
753,900
259,600
169,500
329,500
1,210,300
719,300
462,700
737,200
771,400
993,400
3,102,600
297,200
520,100
132,000
2,078,700
317,900
475,693
4,468,300
2,423,600

UN 2013
518,951
757,903
252,435
186,281
308,420
903,714
788,568
527,429
771,572
882,123
998,666
3,662,384
303,394
349,279
158,076
2,594,382
335,762
475,693
5,178,027
2,979,930

WB 2013
530,401
888,219
265,529
191,205
314,075
1,000,137
784,079
570,188
782,838
1,012,924
1,008,742
3,882,994
282,213
592,292
171,331
2,604,888
352,002
475,693
5,151,142
3,167,905

3. Renunciation Rates
Table 4 and Chart 2 show a rough estimate comparing renunciation rates per
100,000 diaspora populations in 2010 and 2013. It demonstrates that the U.S.
renunciation rate is not in the top-tier. The top three countries are South Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan, all of which require mandatory military service. In the 2010
U.N. data, the U.S. renunciation rate is only 6% of the Korean rate, 13.6% of the
px?source=global-bilateral-migration# (last visited Feb. 17, 2017), because neither the UN
nor the WB provides data on the Taiwanese diaspora population since the early 2000s. I did
not rely on the national statistics of Taiwan for consistency; the number contained in the
national statistics (1,837,000 in 2014) is significantly different from that of the UN or the
WB, which is a commonly observed error gap between national data and international
organizations’ data.
43. For example, the UN Development Programme provides data for 1990 and
2000 as well. See UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS,
POPULATION DIVISION, supra note 41, at tbls.1 & 4.
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Singaporean rate, and 31.8% of the Taiwanese rate. Moreover, if I substitute the
number of the U.S. diaspora population with 6,320,000 for year 2010, which is the
unofficial estimate from the U.S. Department of State, 44 the U.S. renunciation rate
drops further to 24.27, which is only 2.6% of the Korean rate, 5.9% of the
Singaporean rate, and 13.8% of the Taiwanese rate. The U.S. rate increased
significantly in 2013, but it is still 13% of the Korean rate, 25.5% of the Singaporean
rate, and 70.4% of the Taiwanese rate.
Table 4: Renunciation rate per 100K diaspora population in 2010 and 2013

Belgium
Croatia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary
Ireland
Japan
Netherlands
Poland
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Korea
Sweden
Taiwan
U.K.
U. S.

UN 2010
9.02
169.09
173.83
70.28
12.64
3.20
24.65
19.75
3.26
92.04
38.12
10.54
413.03
82.65
8.63
923.95
1.62
176.16
12.35
56.09

WB 2010
9.45
163.28
160.63
72.57
11.53
2.23
25.86
20.96
3.26
98.91
36.34
11.41
403.77
49.99
9.85
1,099.97
1.57
176.16
13.34
63.29

UN 2013
N/A
75.34
N/A
120.25
29.83
N/A
30.56
35.27
N/A
130.03
47.96
N/A
395.53
N/A
N/A
774.37
N/A
142.95
11.63
100.67

WB 2013
N/A
64.29
N/A
117.15
29.29
N/A
30.74
32.62
N/A
113.24
47.48
N/A
425.21
N/A
N/A
771.24
N/A
142.95
11.69
94.70

44. This number is based on the unofficial estimates from the U.S. Department of
State in late 2011. See 8.7 Million Americans (Excluding Military) Live in 160-Plus
Countries, ASS'N AM. RESIDENT OVERSEAS, https://www.aaro.org/about-aaro/8mamericans-abroad (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
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Chart 2: Renunciation rate per 100K diaspora population
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Thus, although it has been reported that the number of renunciations by U.S.
citizens has been increasing dramatically due to the recent FATCA and FBARs
reporting requirements, it is nowhere as serious as those of other countries with
military draft systems.
One might argue that Table 4 is like comparing apples and oranges because
what motivates renunciation varies across the countries. However, each individual
who ended up denouncing citizenship also has his or her own rhetoric. A young
South Korean man who is not married with $150,000 of annual income may be
inclined to renounce his Korean citizenship not only because he wants to avoid the
mandatory military service but also because he does not like the 38% marginal
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income tax rate applicable to his $150,000 annual income, 45 which would be subject
to 28% marginal tax rate in the United States. 46
Truly, we lack empirical studies on the specific motivation of renunciation.
Moreover, Table 4 is not enough to assess the extent of the distortion caused by
citizenship taxation because there are no statistics available on the volume of citizens’
decision to choose American citizenship over other citizenship, despite citizenship
taxation. However, given that the U.S. renunciation rate among the diaspora
population is not relatively significant, we would be better advised not to jump to
the conclusion that citizenship taxation distorts nonresident Americans’ citizenship
decisions in some economically meaningful way.
B. Whether Citizenship Taxation Distorts Non-Americans’ Decision
One of the new contributions of Mason’s article is its discussion of
efficiency as it relates to the immigration decision by non-Americans. Mason argues
that citizenship taxation distorts non-Americans’ inbound migration decisions and
puts the United States at a competitive disadvantage in attracting marginal
migrants. 47 While acknowledging that taxation is not a primary reason for
immigration for most people, Mason focuses on a smaller group of potential—or
“marginal”—migrants with wealth and high skills who can choose where to migrate
as a relevant population for evaluating the efficiency of citizenship taxation. She
argues, “[W]hereas the impact of citizenship taxation on overall migration patterns
is likely to be small, the effect of citizenship taxation may be nevertheless important
to the extent that it affects decisions of highly desirable migrants.” 48
However, even for those marginal migrants’ decision, citizenship taxation
is not as significant as Mason claims. 49 Mason’s argument makes sense in light of
its ceteris paribus assumption—i.e., if all else is equal, citizenship tax may distort
the marginal migrants’ citizenship decision—and one of the important assumptions
is that the U.S. immigration law has a policy to “attract and retain” the wealthy and
highly skilled migrants. 50 However, I am skeptical about that assumption, and agree
with Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt who argued that “U.S. immigration law is not
designed to prefer permanent residence for the highly skilled.” 51 After 9/11, the
United States narrowed the window of opportunity for inbound migration even to
marginal migrants. 52 Most of those marginal migrants start their professional careers
45. Sodeukse beob [Income Tax Act], Act No. 15-33, Jul. 15, 1949, amended by
Act No. 12169, Jan. 1, 2014, art. 55 (S. Kor.).
46. Rev. Proc. 2014–61, § 3.01, 2014–47 I.R.B. 860.
47. Mason, supra note 1, at 227–30.
48. Id. at 223.
49. Mason admits that the empirical data is mixed. Id. at 223 n.302.
50. Id. at 229.
51. Id. at 229–30 n.340.
52. See generally Julia Funke, Supply and Demand: Immigration of the HighlySkilled and Educated in the Post-9/11 Market, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 419 (2015); Michele
R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rethinking Immigration of the Highly-Skilled and Educated
in the Post-9/11 World, 5 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 495 (2007).
For example, before 9/11, many skilled workers with PhD degrees were able to
work at the federal or state government, or do research at an institute with I.R.C. § 501(c)
status, in which case their H-1B work visas were not subject to annual quota. AUSTIN T.
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in the United States under nonimmigrant status, such as an H-1B worker, rather than
through permanent residency. The quota for H-1B visas for both skilled and
nonskilled workers is only 65,000 per year; it used to be 195,000 before 9/11. 53 If
the application number exceeds the quota, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) conducts a computer-generated random-selection lottery. The
recent data shows that 51% of H-1B petitions for year 2015 were rejected in the
USCIS Lottery. 54 And the odds get worse: 64% of petitions were rejected for year
2016 and 2017. 55 Given the narrow entrance gate afforded to those seeking to use
their “high skills” in the United States, there is little room for them to worry about
tax issues when they have less than a 40% chance of getting a work permit. 56
More importantly for our purposes, a significant number of highly skilled
immigrants spend years in the United States as nonimmigrants—such as F1 students
and J1 trainees—before they even apply for a work visa or residency status. A
foreign student or trainee is treated as a resident for tax purposes, subject to
worldwide taxation by the U.S. tax authorities, after five years of staying in the
United States. 57 A trainee may also be treated as a U.S. resident for tax purposes if
she has been a trainee or a student for any two calendar years during the preceding
six calendar years. 58 That means, contrary to Mason’s assumption that the prospect
of worldwide taxation factors significantly into marginal migrants’ decision to
become green-card holders or naturalized citizens, a significant number of marginal
FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., H-1B HANDBOOK § 1:19 Section 3 (2013 ed.). However, after 9/11,
positions at the government and/or at government-sponsored institutions are no longer
available to foreigners in practice because of the newly imposed status requirement of citizen
or green-card holder. Therefore, those highly skilled workers now have to get an offer from
private companies, or participate in the lottery, and the odds of winning the H-1B lottery
have decreased.
53. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 52, at 497. An additional 20,000 of H-1B visas
are reserved for master’s degree holders. For details about the H-1B visa and its cap, see H1B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Project Workers,
and Fashion Models, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporaryworkers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-and-development-projectworkers-and-fashion-models (last updated Mar. 15, 2017).
54. Roy Maurer, 51% of FY 2015 H-1B Petitions Rejected in USCIS Lottery:
Employers Now Playing the Waiting Game, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Apr. 14,
2014), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/safetysecurity/articles/pages/2015-h1b-petitionsrejected-uscis-lottery.aspx.
55. USCIS received nearly 233,000 H-1B petitions during the filing period for
fiscal year 2016, and 236,000 petitions for fiscal year 2017. Both numbers include petitions
filed for master’s degree holders. USCIS Completes the H-1B Cap Random Selection Process
for FY 2016, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-completes-h-1b-cap-randomselection-process-fy-2016 (last updated Apr. 13, 2015); Sara Ashley O'Brien, High-Skilled
Visa Applications Hit Record High—Again, CNN MONEY (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:29 P.M.),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/12/technology/h1b-cap-visa-fy-2017/. The odds are calculated by dividing the number of petitions of a relevant year by the total number of H-1B visas
per year (i.e., 85,000).
56. Once they immigrate to the United States and become a green-card holder or
naturalized citizen, then the distortion, with respect to maintaining citizenship or permanent
resident status, may matter. But such distortion applies to natural-born citizens equivalently.
57. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A), (E)(ii).
58. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A), (E)(i).
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migrants have already been subject to worldwide taxation by the time they apply for
permanent residency or naturalization. Worldwide taxation just happens at some
point during their stay in the United States even when the United States does not
afford them the rights and privileges of citizenship or permanent residency, and even
before they obtain an H-1B work visa in many cases.
In addition, although Mason distinguishes marginal migrants from the
majority migrants who are not wealthy or highly skilled workers so that “taxes are
not an important factor in decisions about where to reside,” 59 taxes would not be of
much importance for marginal migrants, either. There might be various
considerations other than tax that influence the decision to immigrate to the United
States, including women’s low socioeconomic status, racial discrimination, and
political disagreement. Let us consider the case of Google founder Sergey Brin, who
is comparable to Elon Musk whom Mason gives as an example of a marginal
migrant. 60 Brin’s father immigrated to the United States because of the anti-Semitic
practices by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 61 Given that Brin’s family
came to America with exit visas, I assume that Sergey was naturalized along with
his parents when he was a minor. Putting aside the young Sergey’s thought about
the naturalization, would Sergey’s father have decided differently if he had made a
fortune, as his son eventually did, when he was about to be naturalized? I doubt it.
Therefore, I would be hesitant to conclude that citizenship taxation
discourages inbound immigration of wealthy and highly skilled people and puts the
United States at a disadvantage in attracting them. What makes wealthy and highly
skilled immigration to the United States difficult is not the U.S. tax law but is,
instead, U.S. immigration law.
III. ADMINISTRABILITY
A. Determining Residence May Be a Worse Problem
With respect to the administrability argument, I am sympathetic to the
general criticism of citizenship taxation about enforcement difficulties abroad. In
order to address enforcement concerns, several commenters have proposed diverse
alternatives. Brainard Patton, Jr., argues for a pure residence-based taxation system
that applies the same substantial presence test that exists under current law in order
to determine whether a resident is subject to worldwide taxation. 62 However, this
theory is criticized for not corresponding to the ability-to-pay principle, because
many Americans abroad who would not meet the substantial presence test could still

59. Mason, supra note 1, at 222.
60. Id. at 175. Mason gave Sergey Brin as an example of a marginal migrant in
her early draft when I first drafted this Article. Although she changed that example to Elon
Musk in her final draft, I find Brin’s example more intriguing and maintain the example here.
61. Mark Malseed, The Story of Sergey Brin, MOMENT (Feb. 2007), http://web
.archive.org/web/20130121055147/http://www.oldsite.momentmag.net/moment/issues/200
7/02/200702-BrinFeature.html.
62. Brainard L. Patton, United States Individual Income Tax Policy as It Applies
to Americans Resident Overseas: Or, If I’m Paying Taxes Equal to 72 Percent of My Gross
Income, I Must Be Living in Sweden, 1975 DUKE L. J. 691, 730–32 (1975).
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maintain their membership in the national community. 63 A more modified
residence-based taxation system is commonly asserted, under which citizenship is
one factor and the nexus between the taxpayer and the state is considered more
substantially. 64 However, no matter how modified the residence-based taxation
system is, residence, unlike citizenship, naturally requires consideration of all facts
and circumstances. 65 Factors to be considered not only include objective facts, such
as the number of days physically spent in a country, but also more subjective
circumstances, such as how strong the ties are between the taxpayer and the state.
Citizenship would of course be considered as a factor even in the residence-based
taxation. Thus, it is not clear to me how the “modified” residence-based taxation,
which considers citizenship as a factor, could address problems in the “pure”
residence-based taxation.
Furthermore, what proposals to move from a citizenship taxation system to
a (modified) residence-based taxation system may have missed is the observation
that, if the United States retreats from citizenship taxation and adopts (modified)
residence-based taxation, the larger problem may be resource-intensive disputes
over residency, which should be resolved before enforcement. Currently, the United
States rarely challenges its citizens’ residency statuses, whereas the countries with
residence-based taxation are heavily involved in time-consuming, costly tax disputes
with high net-worth individuals with dual residency. 66
The following South Korean cases illustrate how serious the problem of
determining residence can be under a residence-based taxation system in the real
world. South Korea defines a tax resident as a person who has either a residence or
domicile for a year or longer in Korea. 67 Residence is determined by the objective
facts and circumstances of the living arrangements, such as household family

63. Mason, supra note 1, at 231.
64. Id. at 231–33.
65. For example, historically the definition of “resident alien” in the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) relied on subjective factors, such as their economic and other interests
in the United States until the Code adopted the substantial presence test to determine whether
such alien was present 183 days during the tax year and the two preceding years, using a
simple formula in Section 7701(b). Even after adopting the substantial presence test, the
Code allows a “closer connection” exception in Section 7701(b)(3)(B), which considers
various factors, such as the taxpayer’s permanent home, family, personal belongings, social
relationship, financial or business activities, driver’s license, jurisdiction to vote, and
registered residence. CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 44–45 (4th ed. 2011).
66. For example, the two biggest recent tax cases dealing with the income tax of
individual taxpayers in South Korea are residency disputes involving a shipping magnate
and a copper magnate. See Mu-hyun Cho, NTS to Go After Offshore Tax Dodgers, KOREA
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/02/123_130472
.html.
67. Sodeukse boeb [Income Tax Act], Act No. 33, Jul. 15, 1949, amended by Act.
No. 9785, Jul. 31, 2009, art. 1(1)(i) (S. Kor.) before 2009; Sodeukse boeb [Income Tax Act],
Act No. 33, Jul. 15, 1949, amended by Act. No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009, art. 1-2(1)(i) (S. Kor.)
on or after 2010. After several high-profile tax cases relating to residence, Korea tightened
the residence rule in December 2014 by amending the definition of resident to be person who
has either residence or a domicile for 183 days or longer in Korea.
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residing in Korea and domestic assets. 68 If a person has a domicile in Korea for a
year or longer in two consecutive taxable years, she is deemed to have a domicile in
Korea for a year or longer.69 In the early 2010s, Korean tax authorities have
challenged three magnates, arguing that they are Korean residents for tax purposes.
All of them are high profile cases, making a new record for the highest tax
assessment amount in Korean history. However, even in early 2017, the cases were
still pending, and the court opinions are divided.
The first case involves Hyuk Kwon, a shipping magnate, who is the owner
of the Cido Group. In the 1990s, Kwon established Cido Shipping Co., Ltd., and
affiliates in the Cido Group in various countries, including South Korea, Japan,
Hong Kong, Liberia, and the Cayman Islands. The structure of the Cido Group
involves complicated multi-layered ownership using paper companies in tax havens,
all of which are effectively controlled by Kwon by way of registering the stock
ownership under a third party’s name. Kwon has been a Korean citizen and used to
be a Korean tax resident, but he became a Japanese tax resident in 1994, and
Japanese tax authorities taxed him as a Japanese tax resident until 2005. However,
in 2011, on the grounds that Kwon was a Korean tax resident, the Korean tax
authorities issued a Notice of Tax Assessment for the period of year 2006 through
2010 of about 240 million in U.S. dollars to Kwon for individual income tax and of
about 115 million in U.S. dollars to a company established in Hong Kong for
corporate income tax. 70
An interesting point of the shipping magnate case is that Kwon and his
family generally did not spend more than 183 days in South Korea during the
relevant taxable years, as shown in Table 5 below. Nonetheless, Korean tax
authorities argued that, despite such numbers, the tax residence of Kwon and his
family was South Korea, because both their main base of living and economic
activities were in South Korea. First, their main base of living was South Korea
68. Sodeukse beob sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act],
Presidential Decree No. 155, Aug. 5, 1949, amended by Presidential Decree No. 22034, Feb.
18, 2010, art. 2(1) (S. Kor.).
69. Sodeukse beob sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act],
Presidential Decree No. 155, Aug. 5, 1949, amended by Presidential Decree No. 21887, Dec.
15, 2009, art. 4(3) (S. Kor.). This provision is a modified 183-day rule, doubling up the
relevant period to two years rather than one year for a typical 183-day test. Therefore, if a
person stays around 183 days per year in Korea for two consecutive years, which is a year
or longer for two consecutive years, she is deemed to have a domicile in Korea. However, to
comply with the amendment to the definition of “tax resident” in the Income Tax Act,
discussed at supra note 67, the Enforcement Decree revised the relevant provision, so that
now if a person has a domicile in Korea for 183 days or longer for two consecutive years,
she shall be deemed to have a domicile in Korea for 183 days or longer. See Sodeukse beob
sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act], Presidential Decree No. 155,
Aug. 5, 1949, amended by Presidential Decree No. 26067, Feb. 3, 2015, art. 4(3) (S. Kor.).
70. More technically, Korean tax authorities argued that Kwon’s deemed
dividend income rising from the paper company in Hong Kong should be taxed by South
Korea under the controlled foreign corporation rule in Article 17(1) of the Adjustment of the
International Taxes Act. Shipping Magnate Admin. Case, supra note 11; Seoul Central
District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2011Gohap1291, Feb. 12, 2012, rev’d Seoul High Ct. [Seoul High
Ct.], 2013No874, Feb. 21, 2014, aff'd S. Ct., 2014Do3411, Feb. 18, 2016 (S. Kor.)
[hereinafter Shipping Magnate Crim. Case].
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because: (i) their registered residence has been in South Korea since 1992; (ii) their
domicile has been in Seoul, South Korea, since 2004, and they surrendered the
Japanese residence in 2006; (iii) both Kwon and his wife served as high-level
officers in affiliates of the Cido Group located in South Korea; and (iv) the family
almost never visited medical facilities offshore but instead visited Korean hospitals
more than a hundred times between 2001 and 2010. Second, their main base of
economic activities was South Korea because: (i) Kwon controlled the Cido Group
at one of the affiliate’s offices in Seoul, South Korea, since 2004; (ii) the family
transferred 100% of the shares in the Cido Group and their real estate located in
Korea to a paper company, called Melbo International Investment Ltd. (Melbo), in
2006 and 2007; in substance the shipping magnate holds 100% shares of Melbo; (iii)
Kwon and his wife hold multiple credit cards and financial accounts in South Korea;
and (iv) Kwon holds multiple golf resort memberships in South Korea.
Table 5: Number of days that the Kwons were present in Korea71
Year

Kwon
Korea

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Wife
Japan

166
150
139
135
197
104
128
128

199
200
201
192
123
161
159
156

Hong
Kong

6
3
2
37
100
65
78

Korea

203
287
282
217
222
157
154
153

Son
Japan

162
78
83
76
87
132
153
143

Hong
Kong

17
77
58
69

Korea

21
247
365
352
241
95
123

Daughter
Japan

119
26
-

Korea

69
104
12
42
38
70
70

Japan

0
0
0
6
6
0
0

The lower-level courts of Korea agreed with the tax authorities both in
criminal and tax cases. 72 However, it was not certain whether the Supreme Court of
Korea would affirm the lower courts’ decisions because the holdings in other cases
were divided, as discussed below. On February 18, 2016, the Supreme Court of
Korea vacated and remanded the tax case to the Appellate Court, which was
appealed again and is still pending at the Supreme Court in early 2017. However,
the Supreme Court of Korea opined in dicta in the tax case decision that Kwon was
a tax resident during the relevant tax years; and on the same day, it affirmed the
criminal case, treating Kwon as tax resident, and therefore finding him guilty of
offshore tax evasion. 73
Before moving to the second case, it is noteworthy that the court relied on
the benefit theory in the shipping magnate case. The court held Kwon was tax
resident based on the facts and circumstances test. It held that when determining the
71.

Shipping Magnate Admin. Case (Seoul Admin. Ct. decision), supra note 11,

at 31.
72. See e.g., Editorial, Punishing Tax Evaders, KOREA HERALD (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130215000557.
73. Shipping Magnate Admin. Case (S. Ct. decision), supra note 11, at 3;
Shipping Magnate Crim. Case (S. Ct. decision), supra note 70, at 3.
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facts and circumstances of the living arrangement, not only the location of the
household family and assets should be considered but also “the purposes of the tax
system, the location of his or her economic activities to create values as a member
of the society and the location where he or she benefit from the welfare system.” 74
Given that both U.S. Supreme Court and Korean courts endorse the benefit theory,
the judiciary, regardless of the tax rule on the taxation of nonresidents’ income, are
likely to hold in favor of the tax authorities if they find that the alleged taxpayer
seems to benefit from the society. Hence, the benefit theory is not inherently limited
to a particular position on the taxation of nonresidents’ income. 75
The Korean tax authorities next bashed Yong-Keu Cha, a copper magnate
who acquired the largest copper mining company in Kazakhstan.76 Cha was an
employee of Samsung, which had managed the Kazakhstani copper mining
company since 1994. Cha acquired the interest in the mining company held by
Samsung in 2004, and then exited by initial public offering at the London Stock
Exchange in 2005, making capital gains of about 870 million in U.S. dollars. He was
even listed as one of the world's billionaires by Forbes in 2007 and 2008.77 In 2011,
Korean tax authorities assessed him for a tax of about 140 million in U.S. dollars.
As with the shipping magnate, the tax authorities argued that the copper magnate
was a Korean resident for tax purposes. However, in January 2012, the tax tribunal
in the National Tax Service disagreed with the tax authorities, particularly relying
on the fact that Cha stayed in Korea for only about a month per year. This holding
was so inconsistent with the precedent on deemed domiciliary that it gave rise to the
rumor that Cha was implicated in the secret funds scandal of Samsung, which had
to use its significant influence over the tax authorities to close the case.78 Although
the case was buried because the tax authorities did not appeal to the courts, it shows
how complicated and unpredictable the fiercely contested question of residence can
become.
Courts are divided in the third example, which involved a toy magnate.79
Jong-Wan Park has established toy-manufacturing companies in South Korea and
has exported toys manufactured in factories in South Korean and China to Ty Inc.
in the United States. In late 1990s, Park established offshore sales companies in
Hong Kong, and also established paper companies in the British Virgin Islands,
Labuan (Malaysia), and other tax havens to shift profits from the companies in Hong
74. Shipping Magnate Crim. Case (Seoul Central Dist. Ct. decision), supra note
70, at 26.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 10–15.
76. National Tax Service [NTS], Juk-bu2011-0335, Dec. 23, 2011 (S. Kor.)
77. The World’s Billionaires: #754 Yong Keu Cha, FORBES.COM (Mar. 8, 2007,
6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/10/07billionaires_Yong-Keu-Cha_LIEA.html;
The World's Billionaires: #843 Cha Yong-Keu, FORBES.COM (Mar. 5, 2008, 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/10/billionaires08_Cha-Yong-Keu_LIEA.html.
78. Kim Sang-Jo, Editorial, What Is the Truth of Yong-Keu Cha, the Copper
Magnate? (구리왕 차용규의 진실은?), HANGUK ILBO (Aug. 12, 2014), http://news.khan.co.kr
/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201408122059575&code=990100 (S. Kor.).
79. Seoul Admin Ct. [Admin. Ct.], 2012Guhap29028, Jun. 13, 2014 (S. Kor.),
appeal docketed, Seoul High Ct., 2014Nu6236, Aug. 5, 2014 [hereinafter Toy Magnate
Admin. Case]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct. [Dist. Ct.], 2011Gohap119, Feb. 9, 2012, rev’d Seoul
High Ct., 2012No594, June 27, 2014, appeal docketed, S. Ct., 2014Do9026, Jul. 18, 2014
(S. Kor.) [hereinafter Toy Magnate Crim. Case].
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Kong. During the relevant taxable years from 1999 through 2008, Park obtained a
U.S. green card in July 1997, surrendered it in July 2000, and then obtained
permanent resident status of Singapore in 2009, but he also maintained his registered
residence in Korea until 2009 and lives in Korea with his wife to this day.80 Park has
always spent more than 183 days in South Korea during the relevant tax periods, as
shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Number of days that Park was present in Korea 81
Year
Number
of days
in Korea

1999 2000
282

311

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

332

319

297

323

322

314

294

341

Korean tax authorities imposed about 186 million of tax (in U.S. dollars)
and also charged Park with criminal tax evasion. Given that Park always stayed
longer than 183 days in Korea, facts seemed more favorable to the tax authorities
than those in the shipping magnate case (except for the years 1999 and 2000 during
which he was a dual resident by holding a green card and this tie could be broken in
favor of either of the contracting states under the U.S.-Korea tax treaty). However,
Park was found “not guilty” in the District Court’s criminal case in February 2012—
because the court determined that Park was not a Korean tax resident.
It was uncertain whether the court would maintain the same position in the
upper-level courts for Park because after the District Court’s criminal decision for
the toy magnate, the upper-level courts had held against the shipping magnate in
both criminal and administrative cases in 2013 through early 2014. Subsequently on
June 13, 2014, however, the Administrative Court rendered its decision for the toy
magnate, holding that Park was not liable for tax as a resident in 1999 and 2000
when he held a green card. 82 However, on June 27, 2014, just two weeks after the
Administrative Court’s decision, the Appellate Court found Park guilty in the
criminal case, sentencing him to three years in prison and to pay fines of about 22
million in U.S. dollars. The criminal case is pending at the Supreme Court of Korea
and the tax case is pending at the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court is expected
to deliver its final opinion on the series of the tax residence cases, probably in line
with its dicta in the shipping magnate case, but no one knows when it will be.
Obviously, the holding of the toy magnate case is at odds with that of the
shipping magnate case. Because of the inconsistent decisions by the tax authorities
and the courts, the top tax law firms involved in these cases profited handsomely,
and the copper magnate wisely ended his dispute at the tribunal level. Losing the tax
residence cases was so critical to the tax authorities, because no matter how abusive
the tax planning of the taxpayer and the structure of his or her offshore business are,
80. Park’s wife also obtained a green card in 1997 and became naturalized in 2002.
Toy Magnate Admin. Case (Seoul Admin. Ct. decision), supra note 79, at 11-15; Toy
Magnate Crim. Case (Seoul Central Dist. Ct. decision), supra note 79, at 2-6.
81. Toy Magnate Crim. Case (Seoul Central Dist. Ct. decision), supra note 79,
at 6.
82. Toy Magnate Admin. Case (Seoul Admin. Ct. decision), supra note 79, at 62.
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the tax authorities cannot challenge the substantive aspects if they lose on the
threshold issue of residence. The Korean government modified the rules on tax
residence, but a meaningful change was made only to the number of days spent in
Korea, which was tightened from a year per two-year period to 183-days per year. 83
Other factors relating to the facts and circumstances test are illustrated in the
regulations, but those are still not as clear as the criterion of citizenship, and
therefore should be eventually resolved at the court.
Countries with residence-based taxation also have a difficult time enforcing
the tax liability of the residents with respect to their offshore assets and accounts.
However, as observed in the three Korean cases, such enforcement problem is often
not even addressed at all when the tax authorities lose on the question of residency
in court. Determining the residency status is so critical in administering residencybased taxation that governments should divert its limited resources from
enforcement to defining and litigating residence. Given this reality, Edward
Zelinsky’s argument that one of the principal virtues of citizenship taxation is its
bright line makes more sense. 84
B. Is the Compliance Burden Actually Onerous?
What opponents of citizenship taxation particularly concentrate on, in terms
of administrability, seems to be the recent reporting obligation imposed by FBARs
and FATCA. I am just as sympathetic to nonresident citizens, who are subject to
arguably onerous reporting requirements with the risk of severe penalties. However,
to be more precise, it is the FBAR obligation that makes nonresident citizens subject
to onerous reporting requirements, not FATCA. FBAR indeed imposes reporting
obligation to U.S. taxpayers for their foreign financial accounts exceeding
$10,000. 85 However, the IRS has provided the OVDI that a U.S. taxpayer can utilize
to avoid criminal sanctions for the failure to report the existence of, and income
earned on, a foreign account on tax returns as well as for the non-filing of the FBAR.
In exchange for avoiding criminal sanctions, taxpayers will generally be subject to
a 27.5% penalty on the highest aggregate value of their undisclosed offshore assets. 86
In addition, for non-willful violators, IRS provides Streamlined Filing Compliance
Procedures (SFCP), a program that was expanded in 2014 to cover a broader
spectrum of U.S. taxpayers residing abroad and to provide penalty relief. 87
Therefore, nonresident citizens who no longer have a strong economic and social
connection with the United States or happenstance Americans are no longer likely
to be subject to the severe FBAR penalties.
Unlike FBAR, FATCA compliance burden falls mainly on foreign financial
institutions (FFIs) and other foreign entities receiving payments from U.S. sources
by requiring them to identify American accountholders and report information about
their accounts on an annual basis to the IRS. 88 Individuals are not generally required
83.
84.
85.
86.

See supra text accompanying notes 67–69.
Mason, supra note 1, at 174; Zelinsky, supra note 14.
31 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (2016); I.R.M. 4.26.16.1(1).
Scott D. Michel et al., U.S. Offshore Account Enforcement Issues, 16 J. TAX
PRAC. PROC. 65, 79–80 (2014).
87. Id. at 82–84.
88. Id. at 86.
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to report their offshore accounts under FATCA. However, individual taxpayers with
an interest in any “specified foreign financial assets” are required to attach a
disclosure statement (Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets)
to their income tax returns if the aggregate value of such assets is generally greater
than $50,000. 89 Moreover, if the taxpayer is living abroad, the threshold amount is
significantly higher than $50,000, ranging from $200,000 to $600,000. 90 It is hard
to believe that taxpayers holding foreign accounts over those threshold amounts
should be treated the same as the average Joe and Jane, who opponents of citizenship
taxation and FATCA seek to protect from onerous reporting requirements of their
offshore assets. Considering the thresholds, FATCA does not seem to impose
unbearably onerous burden on ordinary nonresident Americans.
IV. FATCA: MERITS AND CONCERNS
The discussion thus far was inspired by Mason’s article, following the
traditional normative framework of citizenship taxation. However, recent debates
about citizenship taxation are, in many ways, motivated by newly enacted reporting
obligations to administer citizenship taxation more effectively. International
discourse that severely condemns the new reporting obligations and the U.S.
international tax policy also encourages the debate over FATCA and citizenship
taxation. Thus, this Part goes further than the normative framework and aims to
defend the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), especially in
conjunction with citizenship taxation.
A. Merits: Enhancing Global Transparency
FATCA and FBAR rules have significant merits as a means to fight offshore
tax evasion. After going through the LGT Bank affair 91 and the UBS scandal, 92 the
89. See I.R.C. § 6038D; Reg. § 1.6038D–1(a)(1). A higher reporting threshold
applies to U.S. persons who are overseas residents and joint filers. Reg. § 1.6038D–1(a)(2).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D-2(a)(3), (4). Those filing a return other than a joint
return file Form 8938 only if the total value of their specified foreign assets is more than
$200,000 on the last day of the tax year or more than $300,000 at any time during the year;
those filing a joint return file Form 8938 only if the value of their specified foreign asset is
more than $400,000 on the last day of the tax year or more than $600,000 at any time during
the year.
91. In February 2008, Heinrich Kieber, a former employee of LGT Truehand, a
trust company affiliated with LGT Bank in Liechtenstein and owned by the Liechtenstein
royal family, stole customer data and provided it to tax authorities throughout the EU and to
the IRS under a newly enacted “whistleblower” provision. See Lynnley Browning, Banking
Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/08/15/business/worldbusiness/15kieber.html.
92. Since 2001, the United States has implemented a qualified intermediary
system (QI) to ensure proper tax enforcement on foreign portfolio investors with respect to
U.S. source income arising from investment in U.S. equity and debt securities. However, the
QI system turned out to have been abused when the famous whistleblower Bradley
Birkenfeld exposed the tax avoidance strategies of UBS for their U.S. customers in 2007.
Non-U.S. persons investing through foreign financial institutions under a QI agreement
could enjoy anonymity with the IRS as well as a more favorable withholding tax than U.S.
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European Union (EU) and the United States, the two most important voices in the
international tax policy community, realized that they were vulnerable to offshore
tax evasion and were losing enormous tax revenues as a result. They also realized
that they had not fully caught up with the techniques utilized by offshore vehicles to
“round-trip” or circulate funds. 93 In addition, the global financial crisis in 2007
caused by the reckless practices of certain financial institutions offered an
opportunity to implement a more active regulatory policy. 94 The financial crisis also
triggered a global discussion regarding overall transparency in the financial industry,
from which a new regime for international taxation has emerged to overcome the
limits of the old regime that allowed the exchange of information (EOI) only upon
request. The OECD’s AEOI and the U.S. FATCA are two important developments,
but FATCA plays a more important role.
First, FATCA provided critical momentum to the OECD’s embarkation on
the AEOI project and the G20’s endorsement of it as “the new single global
standard.” 95 With the success of the revised Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAC) along with the enactment of FATCA in 2010,
AEOI has met with widespread political support since 2012. In February 2014, the
OECD released the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for AEOI on “financial
account,” which is modeled on FATCA, 96 followed by the full and comprehensive
taxpayers. Taking note of these advantages, UBS advised U.S. taxpayers to establish foreign
shell entities, which then opened offshore accounts with UBS and claimed the same
advantages of anonymity and favorable withholding rate. After Birkenfeld revealed this
scheme, UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the United States, under
which it agreed to pay a fine of $780 million and to release the identities of approximately
300 accountholders to the Department of Justice. Reg. §1.1441–1; Itai Grinberg, The Battle
over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 325–26 (2012); Michel et al., supra
note 86, at 70; Blank & Mason, supra note 6, at 2–3.
93. Round-tripping is used to describe a tax evasion scenario through which
taxpayers siphon off their funds to an entity established in a tax haven and then reinvest those
funds in the domestic capital market. See e.g., Michelle Hanlon et al., Taking the Long Way
Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets, 70 J.
FIN. 257 (2015).
94. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (U.S); Directive 2011/61, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending
Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No
1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174).
95. Stephanie Soong Johnston, G-20 Endorses OECD’s Common Reporting
Standard for Automatic Information Exchange, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 37-5 (Feb. 25,
2014); Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, The Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax
Evasion: Towards a New Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of Tax Information:
Remarks Delivered at the EU Informal ECOFIN–Lithuanian Presidency (Sept. 14, 2013),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/thefightagainsttaxfraudandtax
evasiontowardsanewglobalstandardonautomaticexchangeoftaxinformation.htm; OECD
Delivers New Single Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD (Feb.
13, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/oecd-delivers-new-singleglobal-standard-on-automatic-exchange-of-information.htm.
96. Rick Mitchell of Bloomberg BNA explains, “the CRS is modeled on the U.S.
FATCA but has some key differences.” Rick Mitchell, Switzerland Signs OECD Agreement
on Automatic Tax Information Exchange, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 20, 2014, at I-3. See
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report of the “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information
in Tax Matters” (the Standard) in July 2014. The CRS calls on governments to obtain
detailed account information from their financial institutions and to exchange that
information automatically with other jurisdictions on an annual basis. 97 The
rationale behind the CRS is to generate advantages arising from “process
simplification, higher effectiveness and lower costs for all stakeholders
concerned.” 98 The first AEOI among the early group of 54 countries will begin by
September 2017, and the subsequent group of 47 countries, including Switzerland,
is “expected to follow in 2018.” 99
Second, FATCA facilitates multilateral implementation of AEOI by
creating an extensive network with more than 100 countries in the world, at the
center of which is the United States. 100 As of February 23, 2017, 96 countries—
including major trading partners as well as tax secrecy jurisdictions, such as
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Guernsey, Panama,
Hong Kong, and Singapore—have signed IGAs with the United States. Seventeen
countries, including China, have initiated IGAs, and a couple of other countries are
in discussions with U.S. authorities about entering into IGAs. Thus, other countries
may add their network to the U.S. network to complete the multilateral network. In
addition, FATCA spurred similar legislation in various jurisdictions. For example,
the U.K. launched legislation, so-called “son of FATCA,” to require AEOI among
U.K. Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories with respect to U.K.
accountholders on an annual basis. 101 France has also enacted similar legislation,
aiming at offshore trusts having French resident settlors or beneficiaries only. 102 In
May 2013, sixteen EU member states requested to adopt AEOI using FATCA as a
new global standard. 103 All such FATCA-like legislations and agreements are
also Rick Mitchell, Practitioner Sees Possible Negative Effect on Banks as U.S. Hesitates
on Global Standard, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Oct. 30, 2014, at I-4.
97. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
IN TAX MATTERS 230 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/commonreporting-standard/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-taxmatters.htm.
98. Id. at 11.
99. AEOI: Status of Commitments, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax
/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf (last updated Feb. 23, 2017); Switzerland Takes
Important Step to Boost International Cooperation Against Tax Evasion, OECD (Nov. 19,
2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/switzerland-takes-important-step-to-boost-internationalcooperation-against-tax-evasion.htm.
100. Michel et al., supra note 86, at 88. The current IGA status can be checked at
IGA Status, TAX NOTES, http://www.taxnotes.com/FATCA-expert/IGA-status (last updated
Feb. 23, 2017).
101. Blank & Mason, supra note 6, at 6 n.30 (citing John McCann & Angela
Nightingale, Tax Information Sharing, The Rise of “FATCA-esque” Agreements, AIMA J.,
no. 94, Q1 2013, at 71, https://www.aima.org/journal/aima-journal-q1-2013.html). In order
to minimize additional compliance burden, the reporting mechanism in this legislation is
almost the same as that of FATCA, except that this legislation does not enforce 30%
withholding tax upon violation. Id. at 6–7. The U.K. intends to expand this legislation to
other jurisdictions beyond Crown Dependencies. Id. at 7.
102. Because of its limited scope, it has been called a “mini FATCA.” McCann &
Nightingale, supra note 101, at 72.
103. Blank & Mason, supra note 6, at 7.
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expected to be integrated into the platform of AEOI arranged by the OECD’s Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global
Forum).
Third, FATCA, together with FBARs and AEOI, caused Switzerland to
abandon its Bank Secrecy Law and cooperate to provide tax information of its bank
customers to the customers’ residence countries. In August 2013, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Swiss governments announced a special voluntary
disclosure initiative aimed at Swiss banks other than 14 banks under criminal
investigation. 104 The initiative, called the DOJ Swiss Bank Program, would enable
a participating Swiss financial institution to avoid criminal prosecution upon
disclosure of detailed information and the payment of civil monetary penalties. As
of January 27, 2016, DOJ has entered into Non-Prosecution Agreements with 78
Swiss banks under the Swiss Bank Program. 105 Beginning in June 2014, Swiss banks
participating in the Program began to provide exhaustive information on U.S.
accounts to the DOJ and the IRS. 106
Fourth, FATCA applies to the extended category of financial institutions,
which include not only the traditional banking industry but also alternative
investment vehicles, such as private equity funds, hedge funds, real estate
investment trusts, collective investment vehicles, and trusts, 107 which enjoyed
secrecy and less rigorous regulations by using offshore structures. Therefore, greater
transparency from such alternative investment vehicles will soon become mandated.
In conclusion, despite the demerits of excessive extraterritorial enforcement
due to citizenship taxation, FATCA paved the way for the revolution toward global
transparency on tax information. In determining whether the merits of FATCA
outweigh the demerits, one should consider not only the U.S. taxpayers’ compliance
burden but also the global efforts to combat offshore tax evasion and the subsequent
accomplishment of transparency on tax information.
B. Concerns: Tax Privacy and Protection from Abuse
In the preceding part, I argue that although the recent debate on citizenship
taxation is largely motivated by the concerns about the administrative burden caused
by FATCA, the compliance burden by FATCA on individual taxpayers is not
particularly onerous. Criticism of citizenship taxation and FATCA is also
outweighed by the merits of FATCA, which leads the trend of EOI along with the
OECD’s AEOI.
Although FATCA and AEOI seem to have become an irrevocable path in
international tax policy, it nonetheless continues to be subject to criticism based on
the concern that taxpayers’ private information transmitted to foreign tax authorities
via FATCA and EOI may be misused for nontax purposes by foreign governments.
Setting aside the international discourse, the United States has not ratified any tax
104. Joint Statement Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Swiss Federal
Department of Finance (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/7532013
829164644664074.pdf.
105. Swiss Bank Program, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/tax
/swiss-bank-program (last updated Feb. 6, 2017).
106. Michel et al., supra note 86, at 73–74.
107. See Reg. § 1.1471–5(e)(4)(i)(C).
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treaties or protocols since 2010 due to Senator Rand Paul’s consistent objection to
EOI clauses, on the grounds of tax privacy concerns, due process, and the Fourth
Amendment. 108 In July 2015, Senator Paul even filed a lawsuit with six other
plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (the Crawford
case) to challenge the constitutionality of FATCA; the lower court dismissed the
claims but an appeal of the dismissal is now pending at the Sixth Circuit. 109
Such criticism is not directly related to the debate on citizenship taxation.
However, considering that the recent discourse on FATCA is much focused on tax
privacy and due process, it is worth discussing a couple of points of such arguments
in defense of FATCA.
First, opponents of FATCA and EOI value tax privacy—privacy that
prohibits a government from publicly releasing any taxpayer’s tax-related
information 110—as a basic right protected by constitutions of many countries, such
that being required to tender the information to foreign governments violates such
right. However, governments do not disclose a taxpayer’s information via EOI to
the public but instead share information with other governments that may have tax
jurisdiction over that taxpayer. Purely domestic tax information is not subject to
EOI. Among the information that domestic tax authorities have obtained or may
obtain, only information that has “foreign indicia” connecting the taxpayer to the
requesting country is subject to EOI. 111 For a taxpayer with such foreign indicia, it
is reasonable to be subject to multiple tax administrative powers of countries with
which she has nexus.
108. Robert Goulder, Litigating FATCA: Rand Paul and Financial Privacy,
FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/09/16/li
tigating-fatca-rand-paul-and-financial-privacy/. While executive agreements, such as tax
information exchange agreements, do not require Senate approval, tax treaties and protocols
require the advice and consent of the Senate under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. In
practice, most income tax treaties have been approved by unanimous consent of the Senate,
without which the treaty would be subject to a full day debate and possible filibuster. H.
David Rosenbloom & Richard L. Reinhold, Panel Discussion at the USA Branch of the
International Fiscal Association Summer Meeting (July 16, 2014) (on file with the author).
Thus, as long as Senator Rand Paul [R-KY] objects to the EOI clause following the new
global standard, it is unlikely that the United States will ratify any tax treaty in the near
future.
109. Crawford v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 3:15-CV-250, 2016 WL 1642968,
at *1 (S.D. Ohio. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-3539 (6th Cir. May 23, 2016);
William R. Davis & Andrew Velarde, Sen. Paul Files Lawsuit Challenging FATCA, 2015
TAX NOTES TODAY 135-3 (July 15, 2015); Goulder, supra note 108.
110. Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 265,
267 (2011).
111. For example, FATCA requires FFIs to report accounts held by an individual
with U.S. indicia as follows: (i) designation of the accountholder as a U.S. citizen or resident;
(ii) a U.S. place of birth; (iii) a current U.S. residence address or U.S. mailing address
(including a U.S. post office box); (iv) a current U.S. telephone number (regardless of
whether such number is the only telephone number associated with the accountholder); (v)
standing instructions to pay amounts from the account to an account maintained in the United
States; (vi) a current power of attorney or signatory authority granted to a person with a U.S.
address; or (vii) an “in-care-of” address or a “hold mail” address that is the sole address the
FFI has identified for the accountholder. Reg. § 1.1471–4(c)(5)(iv)(B). For U.S. indicia for
entities, see Reg. § 1.1471–3(e)(4)(v)(A).

UF Law 2017 FL Tax Review 20-5 Kim R3.pdf 35

5/13/2017 1:51:01 PM

364

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 20:5

In Crawford, however, Senator Paul and the plaintiffs seem to understand
the definition of tax privacy a bit differently. In the petition, they argue that “FATCA
eschews the privacy rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights in favor of efficiency and
compliance by requiring institutions to report citizens' account information to the
IRS even when the IRS has no reason to suspect that a particular taxpayer is violating
the tax laws,” thereby violating the Fourth Amendment.112 In other words, they argue
that (even if the information is not disclosed publicly) third-party reporting by
foreign financial institutions to the IRS (and sharing such information with foreign
governments) violates the Fourth Amendment.113 However, such interpretation of
tax privacy is unfounded in law and is otherwise unconvincing. Unless they
challenge all third-party reporting requirements, such as Form 1099 by domestic
financial institutions, as unconstitutional, there is no reason to distinguish the thirdparty reporting requirement of foreign institutions from that of domestic ones, at
least under the Fourth Amendment, because both serve to accomplish the same goal
of administering the U.S. income tax.
They also attack the new EOI system as releasing too much tax information
to foreign countries even in the absence of any suspicious activity. Before filing the
lawsuit, Senator Paul argued that while the existing U.S.-Swiss tax treaty requires
EOI to be “necessary for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention or
for the prevention of tax fraud or the like . . . ,” 114 the pending protocol allows EOI
as long as it “may be relevant for carrying out the provision of this Convention or to
the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes . . .” 115 In
short, Senator Paul argues the pending protocol requires disclosure when relevant
rather than when necessary, and thus would no longer require that the severity of the
case be equivalent to tax fraud or the like.
The problem with Senator Paul’s argument is that it contradicts the wellestablished position of the United States relating to the standard of EOI. The Code
sets the domestic standard for the disclosure of information by allowing IRS
summons when it “may be relevant or material to the inquiry.” 116 Article 26 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital used to contain a necessity
standard for EOI until it changed to the foreseeable relevance standard in 2003. 117

112. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Crawford v.
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, (S.D. Ohio. July 14, 2015) (No. 15-250), 2015 WL 4571443.
113. Goulder, supra note 108.
114. Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct.
2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 26(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-8, 1996 WL 903835.
115. Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz.,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 112-1, 1996 WL 34543052 (letter of transmittal, Jan. 26, 2011).
116. See I.R.C. § 7602.
117. Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version, art.
26(1) (2000) (“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention . . . .”). It was
amended by the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed
Version, art. 26(1) (2003) (“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall
exchange such information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this
Convention . . . .”).
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The U.S. Model also changed its standard for EOI from necessity to relevance in
1996, which parallels the domestic standard. 118
In addition, governments do not exchange taxpayers’ information via EOI
beyond the scope protected by the constitution of both the requesting and requested
countries. Tax authorities may legitimately access not only tax returns filed by
taxpayers annually but also taxpayers’ financial information that is necessary or
relevant, whatever the standard is, for the purposes of proper tax administration.
Such access to the taxpayer’s information conforms to “a taxpayer’s reasonable
expectations of privacy.” 119
Second, opponents of FATCA and EOI argue that an EOI system removes
a country’s unilateral control over its own tax policy, resulting in the forfeiture of
sovereign autonomy. 120 Although such argument has withered since the U.S.
government entered into IGAs with other countries, it was strongly asserted by
Canadian opponents of FATCA when the IGA Implementation Act included in Bill31 was debated in Canadian Parliament. 121
However, a government’s control over its tax policy is more severely
harmed when a country segregates itself from the global community and loses the
ability to enforce effectively its own tax laws against its taxpayers with interests in
foreign jurisdictions. Given that people who have resources to use offshore accounts
and/or structures are more likely to be in high tax brackets, 122 blocking the EOI may
favor those people and reduce the fairness of the society’s taxing practices. 123 When
118. U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, art. 26(1),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmodel.pdf (“The competent authorities of the Contracting
States shall exchange such information as may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of
this Convention . . . .”). See Technical Explanation, U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of
September 20, 1996, ¶ 26(1), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmtech.pdf (explaining,
“This Article provides for the exchange of information between the competent authorities of
the Contracting States. The information to be exchanged is that which is relevant for carrying
out the provisions of the Convention or the domestic laws of the United States or of the other
Contracting State concerning the taxes covered by the Convention. Previous U.S. Models,
and the OECD Model, refer to information that is ‘necessary’ for carrying out the provisions
of the Convention, etc. This term consistently has been interpreted as being equivalent to
‘relevant,’ and as not requiring a requesting State to demonstrate that it would be disabled
from enforcing its tax laws unless it obtained a particular item of information. To remove
any potential misimpression that the term ‘necessary’ created a higher threshold than
relevance, the Model adopts the term ‘relevant.’”). The language of Article 26(1) of the U.S.
Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstrty/model006.pdf, is the same as that of the U.S. Model Convention of 1996.
119. Grinberg, supra note 92, at 339 n.121.
120. See, e.g., Hillis v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2015] F.C. 1082 (Can.); Marni
Soupcoff, Ottawa Is Violating Our Constitutional Rights in Order to Help the U.S. Collect
Taxes, CAN. CONST. FOUND. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://theccf.ca/ottawa-is-violating-ourconstitutional-rights-in-order-to-help-the-u-s-collect-taxes/.
121. Hillis, [2015] F.C. 1082 at ¶¶ 35–39. The Hillis case was the first case to
challenge the legal authority and constitutionality of the IGA and AEOI thereunder. The
Federal Court of Canada held that the collection and automatic exchange of information
under the IGA is legally authorized by the IGA and relevant Canadian income tax law, and
is not inconsistent with the U.S.-Canada tax treaty. Id. at ¶ 9.
122. Blank, supra note 110, at 347.
123. Grinberg, supra note 92, at 359.
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people lose confidence in a government’s “equitable treatment enforcement” among
taxpayers, their tax morale may be negatively affected and the extent of voluntary
tax compliance may decrease. 124 Low tax morale in a society triggers higher rates of
tax evasion, 125 such that tax administration, including collection, becomes more
costly and less effective.
Third, while driving to adopt AEOI as the new global standard, the Global
Forum and the OECD have been working to guarantee the trustworthiness and
competence of the participating countries’ EOI activities in general. Now EOI upon
request is available only to those countries that ensure proper use of the information
for legitimate tax purposes, with each jurisdiction to be assessed and rated with
respect to its compliance with the international standard of transparency and EOI on
request by a “peer review system” under the auspices of the Global Forum. 126
Countries that have not passed a peer review are not entitled to EOI. 127
In addition, the concern that FATCA and EOI could be abused by
authoritarian regimes for political purposes carried more weight under the old EOIupon-request regime than under the new FATCA or AEOI regime. This is because
a “request” made by an authoritarian government sends a signal of anomaly or an
implication that such government wants to use the investigatory power of the
requested state; on the other hand, an AEOI is automatic, as its name suggests, and
therefore does not depend on the purposes of the foreign country. 128
Therefore, the right question to ask with regards to FATCA and tax privacy
is not whether tax authorities may, or should, exchange tax information under
124. Tax morale is defined as “the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of citizens to cooperate
with the state by paying taxes.” Blank, supra note 110, at 333. Tax morale is said to be
“affected by factors such as citizens’ perceptions of other citizens’ compliance and by
perceptions of the government’s trustworthiness and competence.” Grinberg, supra note 92,
at 355. See also James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the
United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 228 (2006); Leandra Lederman,
The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453,
1477 (2003).
125. Blank, supra note 110, at 334.
126. The peer reviews take place in two phases: Phase 1 reviews the legal and
regulatory framework and Phase 2 reviews the implementation of such framework in
practice. During the review process, the object country receives evaluations with respect to
ten essential elements. Upon completion of the two-phase review, the country receives an
overall rating of “compliant,” “largely compliant,” “partially compliant,” or “noncompliant.” The Global Forum has completed more than 250 reviews, and the reviews are
still ongoing. More than 90 jurisdictions have changed, or proposed to change, their domestic
laws to implement recommendations from the Global Forum. The Global Forum commenced
a new round of review starting in 2016. OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, TAX TRANSPARENCY, 2016 REPORT ON
PROGRESS 13–21 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GF-annual-report-2016.pdf;
OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX
PURPOSES, TAX TRANSPARENCY, 2014 REPORT ON PROGRESS 24–32 (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFannualreport2014.pdf.
127. The revised MAC declares that it will not admit countries without either
proper domestic law in place or a monitoring and sanctioning system; the peer review
assessment and its high standard are thus likely to be maintained in the AEOI system as well.
Grinberg, supra note 92, at 381.
128. Id. at 380 n.250.
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FATCA, but whether the procedure offers sufficient protection from abuse, and, if
not, then how to improve the procedure. A comprehensive discussion about the
details of the protective measure has not yet been done among the policy makers,
scholars, and practitioners, and would be beyond the scope of this Article.
The extent of protective measure we should offer to taxpayers with respect
to their tax information subject to the new AEOI and FATCA is difficult to
determine. It is even more difficult because there is no established global policy on
an adequate protective measure for tax information subject to the existing EOI upon
request. Some might simply argue that we should provide the same extent of
protection offered under the old EOI-upon-request regime to the new AEOI and
FATCA protocols. However, I argue that the protective measures for the new AEOI
and FATCA should be different. As with the old EOI-upon-request regime,
opportunities for appeal and judicial review should be available, including an
opportunity to raise objections to EOI based on improper purposes and bad faith,
such as political retaliation. In addition, ex ante data protection measures available
under domestic law, such as advance notice to taxpayers, and the opportunity to
quash IRS summonses served to third-party record keepers, 129 should also be
available. In this regard, the EU has articulated a right for data subjects to access
information and obtain “the rectification, erasure or blocking of data” in case of any
inaccuracies. 130 However, it is doubtful whether such ex ante measures should be
available to information subject to the AEOI and FATCA. Although appropriate
protective measures are necessary, insisting on the strict application of ex ante
protection would significantly harm the effectiveness of the AEOI and FATCA.
Considering that the information subject to AEOI and FATCA are mostly accounts
in financial institutions, and that financial institutions have obtained consent from
their customers to report their information to local foreign tax authorities while
preparing for implementing FATCA and AEOI, taxpayers are given a sort of ex ante
notice through third-party record keepers. Therefore, ex post reporting to relevant
taxpayers by tax authorities, which opens the opportunity to appeal and judicial
review, would be adequate protective measures in this case.
C. A Case for American Exceptionalism
Another concern about citizenship taxation and FATCA is that they are hard
to justify as a case for American exceptionalism. 131 Indeed, FATCA was an outlier
in the international tax administrative measures in the beginning, but now it has
129. I.R.C. §§ 7609, 7602(c).
130. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) art. 12, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. The
Directive 95/46/EC applies broadly to personal data and is not limited to tax data, but the
European discourse on protecting tax data in connection with FATCA relies on this Directive
as the legal framework. See Gianluca Mazzoni, The Interaction Between FATCA and Data
Privacy (Oct. 2015) (unpublished manuscript, presented at Taxation and Citizenship
Conference, Univ. of Mich. School of Law) (on file with author).
131. See e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 389; Bernard Schneider, The End of
Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2012).
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become a popular policy adopted more globally.132 United States citizenship taxation
is still an extraordinary policy for taxing nonresident citizens, even after FATCA
became popular. 133 However, as Mason noted, “uniqueness of U.S. citizenship
taxation . . . is not enough to condemn it.” 134 Furthermore, American exceptionalism
could be blamed only if “it creates problems whose costs . . . outweigh the
benefits.” 135 In the previous parts, I compared citizenship taxation and residencebased taxation to demonstrate that citizenship taxation and FATCA could be more
beneficial to the U.S. than residence-based taxation, which could keep citizenship
taxation from being unduly blamed as an example of American exceptionalism.
The criticism that citizenship taxation is an example of the American
exceptionalism is distinguished from traditional normative arguments on citizenship
taxation, because it is not simply limited to a particular tax policy but relates to
broader international issues, where other countries have not been comfortable with
the U.S. insisting on its own unilateral policy. Such criticism could be a serious
threat to citizenship taxation and FATCA, as it would incite a more general
international repulsion. Therefore, it is necessary to defend the case of citizenship
taxation and FATCA on the meta-level of American exceptionalism, without being
proud of it, by thinking about the dynamics between the U.S. unilateral approach
and a multilateral approach.
An interesting discussion is going on in the field of state surveillance and
the right to privacy. In the digital era, governments could more easily access personal
information that is now converged in the cloud. The international discourse has been
skewed by European countries to the position that it is necessary to establish an
international standard on internet surveillance by adopting a multilateral
instrument. 136 However, Stephen Schulhofer opposes the international common
ground of right to privacy, arguing not only that “a multilateral approach would be
bad for Americans” but also that a parochial approach is better for all human
beings. 137 He warns about “the dangers of multilateralism” in three prongs. 138 First,
in the international negotiation where there are wide gaps among countries in their
commitment to privacy, the agreement will eventually be set somewhere between
the most and the least rigorous positions of the players—i.e. regression to the
mean. 139 Second, even within the developed and democratic countries, the way in
which the policy has been developed varies, so that the emphasis is often given to
different points, which makes reaching a common ground quite difficult—i.e.,
institutional dynamics may be an obstacle. 140 Finally, an international agreement
usually provides only the minimum standard as a floor, but once such a floor is
incorporated in the domestic law system, the ceiling, such as constitutional
132. See supra text accompanying notes 95–103.
133. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 206.
134. Mason, supra note 1, at 38.
135. Michael S. Kirsch, Citizens Abroad and Social Cohesion at Home: Refocusing
a Cross-Border Tax Policy Debate, VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=2669543.
136. Stephen Schulhofer, An International Right to Privacy? Be Careful What You
Wish For, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 238 (2016).
137. Id. at 239–40.
138. Id. at 254–59.
139. Id. at 254–55.
140. Id. at 255–57.
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safeguards, tends to descend, influenced by the international accord as a
momentum—i.e., the floor and ceiling merge. 141
Although there are some points where I disagree with Schulhofer, especially
whether a multilateral approach to the AEOI would be beneficial to the rest of the
world, Schulhofer’s concerns regarding relying solely on the multilateral approach
offer insight about FATCA and the newly emerging AEOI system as well. That is,
the U.S. having its own measure, i.e., FATCA, could “exert a stronger upward pull
on global norms.” 142 Even though the OECD and other countries benchmarked the
U.S. FATCA when adopting son of FATCA 143 and CRS as a multilateral instrument
for AEOI, 144 there is no guarantee that such international instruments are as effective
and sophisticated as what the United States adopts by itself and provide sufficient
procedural justification or protective measures. Most importantly, CRS does not
impose sanctions—e.g., thirty percent withholding tax—in case of noncompliance.
So far, FATCA is the only device that can enforce global AEOI and indeed has
incited other countries to join the AEOI system.
Another example of FATCA leading the global norm of international tax
with a higher standard is that there has been no comprehensive international tax
policy on investment funds, substantively or procedurally, because none of the
multilateral instruments in international tax, including various OECD models, has
yet included investment funds, such as private equity or hedge funds, in their
scope. 145 Even the OECD’s final Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action
plan on tax treaty benefits failed to conduct meaningful discussion about such
investment funds. 146 However, FATCA has included investment funds in the
definition of financial institutions and made them subject to its reporting obligation.
It was by far the first decent international tax policy on investment funds to enhance
transparency, although it is limited to the procedural matter. It is not certain,
however, how robustly the CRS or son of FATCA will do the same on investment
funds.

141. Id. at 257–59.
142. Id. at 240.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 100–103.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 95–99.
145. See e.g., OECD, The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income
of Collective Investment Vehicles, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
2010 (FULL VERSION), at R(24) (2012), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/chapter
/9789264175181-117-en.
146. In 2014, when the OECD released its interim report on the BEPS Project, it
recognized various problems, such as treaty entitlement of non-collective-investmentvehicle (CIV) funds and noted that further work is needed. See OECD, PREVENTING THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES 18 (2014),
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264219120-en. However, the discussion
failed to reach a conclusion before the final report was released in October 2015, and
ultimately the OECD did not again offer any policy consideration regarding investment
funds. OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6—2015 FINAL REPORT 15 (2015), http://www.oecdilibrary.org/taxation/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriatecircumstances-action-6-2015-final-report_9789264241695-en.
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In this regard, Reuven Avi-Yonah’s argument for constructive unilateralism
resonates. 147 Avi-Yonah criticizes the recent trend in the international tax proposals,
which urge the United States to follow other countries’ tax policy, such as territorial
tax system or patent box regime; he argues that in many cases the United States
unilaterally leading international tax reform could be better for “the interest of both
the U.S. and of other countries.” 148 While he praised FATCA as an example of
constructive unilateralism, which leads to “the most extensive multilateral
agreement in tax matters,” such as MAC and AEOI, he offers citizenship taxation as
a counter-example due to its difficulty of enforcement.149 However, FATCA and
citizenship taxation are two sides of the same coin. More precisely, FATCA is a
means to accomplish the policy aim of citizenship taxation. I do not find a legitimate
reason why the United States should follow other countries as an end when it could
move unilaterally as a means. If FATCA would be considered an example of
constructive unilateralism, citizenship taxation should get credit for launching it.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that citizenship taxation is actually good policy. Both
citizenship-based and residence-based taxation have flaws in accounting for ability
to pay in the fairness argument. With respect to efficiency, it is not clear that
citizenship taxation actually distorts nonresident Americans’ citizenship decisions
more seriously than that of other countries’ citizens. Furthermore, the argument
about the distortion of non-Americans’ immigration decisions is less convincing
because what makes it difficult for wealthy and highly skilled immigrants to
immigrate to the United States is not citizenship taxation but immigration law.
As to administrability, a bright line of citizenship criterion is definitely a
virtue. Three Korean cases illustrate that determining residence under residencebased taxation could be a worse problem than enforcing citizenship taxation abroad.
FBARs and FATCA, which were introduced to improve compliance of citizenship
taxation, were in the beginning onerous burden for nonresident citizens. However,
the rules have been improved to reduce the compliance burden, particularly for
nonresident citizens. In addition, despite the demerits of excessive extraterritorial
enforcement due to citizenship taxation, FATCA and FBARs played an important
role in implementing AEOI and knocking down Swiss banks’ secrecy policy. The
fact that FATCA, FBAR, and U.S. citizenship taxation make the world better off by
enhancing transparency would be another case for citizenship taxation as well as for
constructive American exceptionalism.

147. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Constructive Unilateralism: US Leadership and
International Taxation (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 463, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2622868.
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id. at 9, 10.

UF Law 2017 FL Tax Review 20-5 Kim R3.pdf 42

5/13/2017 1:51:01 PM

